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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the relation between insider trading and the likelihood of insolvency 
with a specific focus on the directors’ sale and purchase transactions preceding insolvency. We 
use a unique dataset on directors’ dealings in 474 non-financial UK firms, of which 117 filed 
for insolvency, over the period 2000-2010. We show that the directors of insolvent firms 
increase their purchase transactions significantly as the insolvency approaches. The results also 
reveal a significant relation between three different measures of insider trading activity and the 
likelihood of insolvency, which is observed to be positive only during the last six-month trading 
period. The relation is negative for the earlier trading periods. While the earlier purchase 
transactions appear to be motivated by superior information held by insiders, the purchase 
trades closer to the insolvency date are possibly initiated by directors’ motives to influence the 
market’s perception of the firm in an attempt to avert or delay insolvency.    
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1. Introduction 
Corporate bankruptcies2 have serious consequences for creditors as well as owners of firms. 
When a firm goes bankrupt, the value of shareholders’ claims on the firm’s assets normally 
becomes zero and creditors can expect to recover their claims only partially because of the 
costs of bankruptcy. The size of these costs is determined mainly by the nature of the bankrupt 
firm’s assets, the complexity of its business and financial structure, the firm’s size and agency 
conflicts between directors, shareholders and debt holders. Furthermore, the costs that are born 
by managers can be more significant as their reputation and human capital are damaged in 
bankruptcy (Eckbo, Thorburn and Wang 2012; Gilson 1989). The costs implications have led 
researchers to investigate the factors that are likely to be associated with corporate 
bankruptcies. However, while there has been considerable research examining the factors 
contributing to the likelihood of bankruptcy (see, e.g., Altman 1986; Campbell, Hilscher and 
Szilagyi 2008; Hillegeist et al. 2004; Ohlson 1980), the extent to which insider trading is 
relevant in explaining corporate bankruptcies is largely unknown. This paper aims to fill this 
gap by investigating empirically the relation between insider trading and the likelihood of 
insolvency in the UK. 
Insider trading is relevant to the investigation of corporate bankruptcies for at least two 
reasons. First, it is recognised that insiders have a better insight into their companies’ prospects 
and hence have informational advantage over outside investors. Therefore, while insiders trade 
on the superior information they hold, outsiders can make abnormal profits by replicating 
insiders’ trading strategies. Prior studies of insider trading indeed provide strong evidence in 
support of this view. It is shown that buy-and-hold returns from trades that mimic insiders 
generate abnormal profits in the long-term, taken as evidence that insiders trade on superior 
private information (see e.g. Jiang and Zaman 2010; Lakonishok and Lee 2001; Ozkan and 
                                                 
2 Corporate bankruptcy is referred to as insolvency in the United Kingdom. We use these terms interchangeably 
throughout paper. 
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Trzeciakiewicz 2014; Seyhun 1986). Second, it is also shown that the market’s reaction to 
directors’ dealings is significant. While purchases made by directors are seen as a signal of 
positive information, the market’s reaction to sale transactions is generally negative (see, e.g., 
Fidrmuc, Georgen and Renneboog 2006; Jaffe 1974;). Accordingly, to the extent that insider 
trading is informative for the firm’s future performance and the market reacts to trades 
significantly in the short-term, the trading behaviour of directors prior to bankruptcy is also 
likely to be informative for the subsequent event of bankruptcy. 
In light of the above discussion, we argue that directors are likely to have additional 
incentives to trade shares preceding insolvency. For example, they are likely to sell shares as 
the value of their holdings is expected to reduce to zero in insolvency. However, insiders may 
have incentives to impact the market’s perception of their firms by purchasing shares near 
insolvency. In both cases, directors are expected to trade shares actively prior to insolvency, 
which may generate a meaningful relationship between insider trades prior to insolvency and 
the likelihood of insolvency. Furthermore, the motives of directors for doing so are expected 
to be stronger in the period preceding the announcement of insolvency. Finally, we do not rule 
out the possibility that trades can partially be motivated by the directors’ (possibly biased) view 
that shares are under- or overvalued during the period leading up to insolvency.3 
The main objective of this paper is to provide further insights into the questions whether 
and how insider trading behaviour in insolvent firms prior to insolvency differs from that in 
similar solvent firms. In doing so, we examine empirically the relation between directors’ 
dealings and the probability of insolvency using a unique dataset of 474 non-financial UK 
firms, of which 117 filed for insolvency during the period 2000 to 2010. 
The analysis is carried out in two stages. First, to shed light on the patterns of directors’ 
dealings before the event of insolvency, we provide a detailed analysis of share purchases and 
                                                 
3 It is shown in the literature that insiders of solvent firms also trade on the basis of their contrarian beliefs, buying 
(selling) undervalued (overvalued) shares in an attempt to take advantage of any perceived misevaluation (Jiang 
and Zaman 2010). 
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sales, which are made by the directors of insolvent firms prior to insolvency. We also compare 
these trades with those made during the same period by the directors of solvent firms that 
operate within the same industry. Second, we examine the relevance of the trading 
characteristics of directors in determining the likelihood of insolvency. Specifically, we employ 
a logistic regression with a dichotomous dependent variable, taking the value of one if the firm 
goes insolvent during the sample period and otherwise zero. While in the first stage we examine 
mainly the patterns of trading characteristics before insolvency, in the second stage we 
empirically investigate the link between directors’ share dealings and the likelihood of 
insolvency. We do not assert in the paper that insider trading directly affects the probability of 
insolvency in such a way that it can be used in bankruptcy prediction models. Although this is 
not to say that insider trading has no bearing on the likelihood of insolvency, we argue that the 
distinct patterns of insider trading can be associated with the subsequently observed insolvency. 
We conjecture that the relation arises from the concerns that managers may have regarding the 
damage that insolvency can inflict on their reputation and human capital. 
In both stages of our empirical analysis, three non-overlapping windows are considered to 
examine whether the trading patterns of directors change as insolvency approaches, namely 0–
6, 6–12, and 12–24 months before the last recorded insider trading activity. The most relevant 
period for understanding the trading motives of insiders in this respect is likely to be the months 
leading up to the point in time when the last trade is observed.  
Our analysis in the first stage shows that in the last trading period (i.e. 0-6m) insiders change 
their trading patterns considerably. Specifically, we find that during this period a significantly 
greater number of directors trade. Additionally, we observe that during this period both the 
total and average number of trades per director increase sharply. Moreover, importantly, these 
changes detected are largely driven by purchase transactions. That is, both the number of 
directors who purchase stocks and the total number of their purchase transactions increase 
significantly in the last trading period, while the sale transactions are stable across the last two 
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trading periods. Finally, during the last trading period we observe that the average purchase 
transaction value goes up more significantly than the average value of sales. Our findings 
contrast those reported in early literature which present evidence on the abnormalities in insider 
trading patterns ahead of corporate bankruptcies in the US (see e.g. Gosnell, Keown and 
Pikerton 1992; Loderer and Sheenhan 1989; Ma 2001; Seyhun and Bradley 1997). They 
generally find that the directors’ insider trading decline before the bankruptcy announcement. 
Moreover, it is shown that insiders increase the volume of sales and thereby attempt to avoid 
significant losses in their holdings. 
The logistic regression analysis shows that insider trading, where the main variable of 
interest is the net purchase ratio (NPR), is significantly related to the likelihood of insolvency. 
However, the nature of the relationship between NPR and the likelihood of insolvency changes 
across the periods. While the relation is negative in the distant periods, it becomes positive and 
significant during the period preceding insolvency. The findings also reveal that both trade 
volume and the trading activity of directors are associated positively with the probability of 
insolvency in the last period leading up to insolvency. Conversely, they exert a negative 
influence on the likelihood in the earlier two trading periods.  
 This study contributes to the literature on insider trading and corporate bankruptcies in 
several important ways. Firstly, to our knowledge, this is the first attempt in the literature to 
explore the association between insider trading and the likelihood of insolvency. By examining 
the insider trading in insolvent firms, this study provides important insights into our 
understanding of managerial behaviour in the presence of severe asymmetric information and 
costly corporate bankruptcies.  
Secondly, this paper investigates the relation between insider trading and insolvency in an 
interesting setting that has distinct characteristics in relation to corporate bankruptcy 
procedures. Compared to the US, the UK insolvency code provides stronger protection to 
creditors, making it relatively easier for creditors to force financially distressed firms into 
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insolvency (Acharya, Sundaram and Kose 2011; Ozkan 1996). Moreover, whereas under 
Chapter 11 in the US the incumbent management is allowed to maintain control of the firm’s 
assets, in the UK the managers of insolvent firms surrender control to insolvency practitioners. 
Therefore, these features of the UK insolvency code, combined with the aforementioned 
expected managerial costs of insolvency, gives rise to opportunity to shed further light on the 
managerial incentives that can have implications for other stakeholders in the firm.  
Thirdly, our study contributes to efforts to understand the interaction between corporate 
governance characteristics and corporate bankruptcies. To the extent that good corporate 
governance reduces the cost of financing and enhances firm performance, an effective 
corporate governance structure is expected to reduce the probability of insolvency. We note 
that prior research investigating the role of corporate governance in determining the probability 
of bankruptcy is dominated by studies carried out for US firms (Daily and Dalton 1994a&b; 
Fitch and Slezak 2008; Gilson 1990; Platt and Platt 2012). However, although the UK and the 
US have similar corporate governance structures, there are also enough important differences 
regarding, for example, the monitoring and disciplining of company directors by institutional 
investors. We therefore argue that these differences warrant further investigation into the role 
of corporate governance in determining the likelihood of insolvency.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the regulatory 
framework, which sets out the rules regarding directors’ dealings. Sections 3 and 4, 
respectively, describe the methodology and data used in the study. Section 5 presents the results 
of univariate and multivariate analyses. Section 6 provides a discussion on the findings and 
section 7 concludes the paper.  
2. The Regulatory Framework on Directors’ Dealings and Insolvency in the UK 
The main legislation and source of company law in the UK, which regulates the dealings 
of directors, including stock purchases and sales by directors, is the Companies Act 2006. 
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Under the law, directors are required to notify the company of any dealings in its shares no 
later than on the fifth business day following the transaction. Companies must in turn notify 
the Company Announcements Office of the London Stock Exchange without delay and no later 
than the end of the next business day following receipt of the information by the company. In 
addition, the Model Code on directors’ dealings, set out in Chapter 9 of the Listing Rules (LR9 
Annex 1)4, provides further guidance for companies and directors in relation to directors’ 
dealings. Several of the requirements are of particular importance in the context of insider 
trading prior to insolvency. For example, regarding the purpose of directors’ dealings, it states 
that directors must not deal in any securities of the company on considerations of a short-term 
nature. The Code also requires directors not to deal during “close period” (also known as the 
blackout period) that is the period of two months preceding the announcement of the 
company’s annual or half-yearly results. More importantly, directors must not deal at any time 
when they are in possession of unpublished price-sensitive information in relation to the 
security. 
There is, to our knowledge, no separate legislation regulating directors’ dealings in 
financial distress prior to insolvency. However, the wrongful trading provision in the 
Insolvency Act 1986 (Section 214) should provide a benchmark  that directors can use to judge 
whether a wrongful trading claim can be brought forward against them as a result of their trades 
in their own shares when their company is in financial distress. Under the law, directors will 
incur liability for wrongful trading if they continued to carry on their business when they knew 
that there was no reasonable prospect of the company avoiding insolvent liquidation. It is, 
therefore, reasonable to assume that directors would stop trading in their shares once they have 
established that their company faces insolvency and hence a wrongful trading claim can be put 
forward against them in insolvent liquidation. 
                                                 
4 See http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/policy/listing_rules for an extensive analysis of the current and historic 
Listing Rules in the UK. 
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The 1986 Insolvency Act establishes four routes to formal reorganization, namely 
liquidation, receivership, administration and company voluntary arrangements (CVAs). The 
most common insolvency procedure in the UK is administration. The main objective of 
administration is the survival of the company as a going concern. Although this aspect of the 
UK insolvency procedures is similar to Chapter 11 of the US, there is an important difference 
between the two procedures, which may help explain some of the insider trading characteristics 
observed in the UK. In the UK, the control of the company passes to an insolvency practitioner 
(the administrator) who takes over management and conducts the day-to-day management of 
the company without any personal liability. Whereas the displacement of management is a 
significant outcome of insolvency in the UK, filing for Chapter 11 in the US safeguards 
directors’ position.  
Taken together, the loss of control can hence be used to explain why the directors in the 
UK would be reluctant to file for administration. On the other hand, it can be argued that the 
wrongful trading provision (Section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986) provides incentives for 
directors to resort to administration as doing so would reduce the likelihood of potential 
personal liability. 
3. Methodology and determinants of insolvency likelihood 
3.1 Methodology 
We model the probability of insolvency using a logistic regression where the dependent 
variable is binary, taking the value of 1 if the firm goes insolvent and 0 otherwise. We estimate 
the following model. 
 Pr(y=1|𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)=G(β0+β1x1+…+βkxk) (1) 
where P(x) is the probability of the insolvency outcome occurring (i.e. the outcome y = 1) given 
the vector of explanatory variables xi. Time and industry dummies are included in all 
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specifications. Although statistically significant logit coefficients of the independent variables 
indicate that they have influence on the predicted probability of insolvency, their economic 
interpretation is not as straightforward as, for instance, it is for OLS estimates. While OLS beta 
coefficients show the effect of a marginal change in explanatory variables on dependent 
variable, logit beta coefficients are expressed in terms of log-odds units, specified by 
  Pr(y=1|x)=e(β0+β1x1+…+βkxk)/(1+e(β0+β1x1+…+βkxk))  (2) 
The signs of estimated coefficients indicate whether higher values of independent variables 
lead to a lower or higher likelihood of a y = 1 outcome. To assess how different values of x 
influence the likelihood of insolvency, one can use either odds ratios or fitted probabilities. The 
odds ratio shows how the likelihood of a y = 1 outcome (i.e. insolvency) changes between two 
values of an explanatory variable. However, given that the odds ratio requires a benchmark 
value of an independent variable, it is not helpful to estimate predicted values of a y = 1 
outcome for a given value of x. Instead, the preferred method is first to substitute the desired 
values of explanatory variables in the estimated logit model to calculate logit odds value for 
the model. Substituting this value in Equation 2 allows us to derive the probability of 
insolvency for a specific value of an explanatory variable while holding all other independent 
variables at their mean values. 
3.2 Determinants of the likelihood of insolvency – explanatory variables 
To examine the trading motives of insiders prior to insolvency, we consider the following 
proxies of insider trading: 1) net purchase ratio (NPR), measured as the ratio of the difference 
between aggregate purchases and sales to the sum of aggregate purchases and sales made by 
insiders, where a positive value indicates greater purchase than sale activities and vice versa; 
2) the number of transactions, given by the total number of purchases and sales made by 
insiders; and 3) the percentage of actively trading members on the board of directors. While 
the first variable is to capture the impact of the type of directors’ transactions, the last two 
10 
 
variables are included to test the extent to which the trading activities of directors impact the 
likelihood of insolvency5. 
In our investigation, similar to previous research, we also control for several important 
accounting and market characteristics as potential determinants of the likelihood of going 
bankrupt (e.g., Altman and Narayanan 1977; Charitou, Neophytou and Chatalambous 2004; 
Shumway 2001). It is shown in this strand of the literature that leverage, firm size, stock returns 
and their volatility are the main factors that impact on the probability of bankruptcy. In 
addition, we acknowledge the potential role of corporate governance in reducing the agency 
and asymmetric information problems within corporations and hence the likelihood of 
bankruptcy (see e.g. Lajili and Zéghal 2010; Poletti-Hughes and Ozkan 2014; Sudarsanam, 
Wright and Huang 2011). The distinct UK corporate governance features, including 
insufficient external market discipline, lack of efficient monitoring of company directors by 
institutional investors, make the inclusion of firm-specific corporate governance characteristics 
in the analysis essential. Also, apart from the attributes that may facilitate insider trading, an 
effective corporate governance structure plays an important role in reducing the probability of 
insolvency through the resulting lower cost of and easier access to external financing (Poletti-
Hughes and Ozkan 2014). 
To investigate the role of corporate governance in determining the likelihood of insolvency, 
we consider four measures, namely board size and independence, managerial and institutional 
ownership. Board size is expected to lower the likelihood of insolvency. Contrary to the view 
that small boards are more efficient and better organized than larger boards, which should lead 
to better firm performance (see, e.g., Yermack 1996), firms with larger boards would have a 
lower probability of insolvency if directors provide firms with more business contacts (Platt 
and Platt 2012). Board independence has been widely researched in the literature. It is argued 
that boards with greater number of independent directors are more likely to monitor and 
                                                 
5 The full list and definition of the variables used in the model is given in Appendix 1. 
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discipline the firm’s management, and hence help align the interests of shareholders and 
managers (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Furthermore, financially distressed firms should have a 
better chance of survival as the access of independent boards to external finance is expected to 
be easier, which is essential to avoid bankruptcy. Finally, it is also shown that the market reacts 
more positively to decisions taken by outsider-dominated firms (Borokhovich, Parrino and 
Trapani 1996). Consequently, we predict that board independence is negatively associated with 
the likelihood of insolvency.  
We expect the impact of board ownership on the likelihood of insolvency to be negative. 
There is a great deal of research arguing that managerial ownership can help align the interests 
of managers and shareholders. This happens because managers bear greater part of the costs of 
their actions as their equity ownership of the firm increases (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Better 
aligned interests, in turn, reduce the costs of asymmetric information and agency problems, 
lowering the likelihood of insolvency.  
We also examine the role of institutional ownership in determining the likelihood of 
bankruptcy. There are two competing views regarding the corporate governance role of 
institutional investors and hence we do not have a clear-cut prediction as to the role of 
institutional ownership in determining the probability of insolvency. On the one hand, the 
theoretical view that dominated the literature for years is that large institutional investors can 
help mitigate the effects of agency and information asymmetry problems in firms characterised 
by dispersed ownership structure. Compared to individual investors, they have greater voting 
powers when the rest of the equity ownership is dispersed among large number of shareholders. 
In line with this “active monitoring hypothesis”, the positive impact of institutional ownership 
on the quality of overall corporate disclosure of firms, and hence the decrease in the firm’s cost 
of debt through the reduced risk of default, is well-documented (see, e.g., Ajinkya, Bhoraj, and 
Sengupta, 2005). On the other hand, it is argued that the myopic behaviour of institutional 
investors can result in a passive corporate governance role (McConnell and Servaes 1990). In 
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line with this view, it is shown that institutional investors, despite their large ownership position 
in the UK firms, do not take an active role in corporate governance, adopt a passive stance 
towards monitoring and disciplining firms’ management, and hence have little influence on 
managers (Franks, Mayer and Renneboog 2001). Moreover, institutional investors can collude 
with managers to extract private benefits and enable the firm’s managers to get entrenched 
(Pound, 1988). 
4. Data 
4.1. Sample selection 
This study is based on a unique set of data, which combines information from three different 
sources, namely Companies House, DataStream, and Morningstar UK. We start by identifying 
the listed non-financial UK firms that entered insolvency procedures over the period 2000 to 
2010. For this purpose, we used the current activity status of companies posted on the 
Companies House website (http://www.companieshouse.gov.uk), which, in addition to the full 
name and status of companies, contains the date of filing for insolvency. We classify firms as 
insolvent by using a binary variable, with 1 representing their status as one of the following 
insolvency procedures: administration, liquidation, receivership, or voluntary administration; 
and 0 otherwise. Consequently, we identify 234 listed non-financial firms that entered 
insolvency procedures during the sample period.  
Subsequently, using International Securities Identification Numbers (ISINs), we append 
accounting and market data from the Datastream and corporate governance and insider trading 
information from the Morningstar UK. We observe that there are firms which stop producing 
financial statements well ahead of entering insolvency, and hence we restrict our sample to 
those companies for which the gap between the date of the last available financial statements 
with fully available information and the date of entering insolvency does not exceed three 
years. As a result of this restriction, and the limited availability of corporate governance or 
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insider trading data, we lose about half of the firms from our initial sample, and finalise the 
dataset with 117 insolvent companies with the complete set of information. 
The insider trading data obtained from Morningstar UK includes information on the 
transactions of all directors and other major shareholders. For our analysis, we select purchases 
and sales performed by only executive and non-executive directors on the board as they are 
more likely to be better informed than others. Trading data were collected up to two years 
before the last observed trading date that is taken as the point in time when directors are 
assumed to stop trading due to expected insolvency concerns. We find that the amount of time 
between the last trading date of directors and the date of insolvency filing is on average two 
years.6 Finally, we aggregated the characteristics of multiple transactions for three non-
overlapping windows, namely the six-month period prior to the last observed director trading 
date (0–6m); the earlier six-to-twelve month period (6–12m); and the preceding one-to-two 
year period (12–24m).  
To examine the likelihood of insolvency, we match the insolvent companies with those in 
the control sample, created using the following process. First, in line with previous research 
(see, e.g., Keasey and Watson 1987; Morris 1997; Piesse and Wood 1992), we choose as many 
solvent companies as possible to match with the insolvent ones in terms of industry 
classification benchmark (ICB) and year of observation.  Subsequently, due to the main focus 
of the study, namely insider trading, we remove those firms from the control sample, for which 
the trading information for the period under consideration is not available. Finally, we limit our 
control sample to up to ten solvent firms for every insolvent firm, which are of similar size, 
measured by the value of total assets. As a result, we end up with a sample of 474 firms of 
                                                 
6 This is in line with the findings of previous research (e.g., see, Hernandez Tinoco and Wilson 2013). However, 
it should be noted that our analysis refers to the date of the last share transaction (purchase or sale) by the directors 
of insolvent firms. This date does not necessarily correspond to the date when the financial distress is observed 
externally. The directors of insolvent firms are likely to stop trading much earlier to avoid accusations that they 
trade in company shares when they are in possession of unpublished price-sensitive information. 
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which 117 are insolvent.7 Out of four insolvency procedures, administration is the most 
frequently used, with 66 firms filing for this insolvency procedure. There are 32 and 13 firms 
which filed for liquidation and receivership respectively, while there are only 6 firms in the 
sample, which were declared insolvent through voluntary arrangements. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Table 1 presents the composition of the firms used in the analysis. Specifically, Panel A of 
the table shows the number of insolvent and solvent firms for each year in the sample period. 
The highest number of firms observed during the period is 68 in 2003, 23 of which are 
insolvent. Moreover, there are only 14 observations in 2005, with eight solvent and six 
insolvent firms. It is also worth mentioning that there are only three insolvent firms included 
in the sample in 2009, while the total number of firms is 25. Panel B presents the distribution 
of firms across the industries classified on the basis of Industry Classification Benchmark. The 
distribution is generally well balanced across the industries with the exception of the 
technology sector, represented by only 13 (five solvent and eight insolvent) firms. Although 
not reported in the table, the average age for insolvent (solvent) firms in our sample is 16 (17), 
where firm age is measured by the number of years since the firm was first listed on the stock 
exchange. All the firms in the sample are listed on the London Stock Exchange. 
4.2. Characteristics of transactions 
                                                 
7  As discussed in Zmijewski (1984), sample selection bias is likely to arise in insolvency models that use non-
random sampling as the ratio of cases to controls differs from that of the population, such as in matched pairs 
where the ratio is 50:50. Zmijewski (1984) finds that the sampling bias decreases as the ratio of cases to controls 
approaches that of the population. Therefore, to reduce selection bias caused by overestimating the “failure” 
observations with regards to those of the population, we follow the one-to-many sampling design which has been 
recently applied by Platt and Platt (2012) in a study of corporate board attitudes and bankruptcy. However, for 
robustness purposes, we also perform our analysis on 117 pairs of insolvent and solvent UK listed firms, matched 
on the basis of firm size and industry classification as in Platt and Platt (1990), and Tennyson et al (1990). The 
results are consistent throughout the analysis and hence are not discussed separately. 
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Table 2 presents information on several important characteristics of the open-market 
purchases and sales carried out by the directors in both solvent and insolvent firms. This 
information is provided for the three windows separately.  
Panel A reports the total number of transactions observed, together with the average 
transaction size measured both in sterling (£) terms and as a share of market value. Panel B, on 
the other hand, gives information on the volume of trade per director. In particular, it shows 
the total number of trading directors observed and their average volume of trade measured in 
sterling terms and as a share of market value. We also provide mean-difference tests for the 
values reported across insolvent and solvent firms.8 In discussing the results we focus on the 
last two six-month trading windows, namely 0–6m and 6–12m periods, to underline the 
changes in the pattern of trading within the last 12 months of insiders’ activity in insolvent 
firms. 
Our investigation leads to several important observations.  Starting with Panel A, firstly, it 
is clear that the number of purchase transactions increases during the last trading period. While 
the increase is observed for both solvent and insolvent firms, the changes for the group of 
insolvent firms are significantly greater. Specifically, the number of purchase transactions in 
insolvent firms increase from 152 in the 6–12m window to 413 in the 0–6m trading window, 
suggesting about a 172 percent increase. The percentage increase for the same variable in 
solvent firms is 11 percent, corresponding to an increase from 823 in the 6-12m period to 914 
transactions in the 0-6m period. Secondly, compared to purchases, there are fewer sale 
transactions during the last two trading windows. There are 48 (36) sales made by the insolvent-
firm directors in the 0–6m (6–12m) window, corresponding to a 33 percent increase. The 
number of directors engaging in sale transactions is also small, increasing from 26 in the 6–
12m window to 33 during the last-trading period. Interestingly, compared to the previous six-
                                                 
8 Although we report the parametric test results for comparing the mean values of the variables across the two 
groups, our findings are also verified using two non-parametric tests, namely both Mann-Whitney and Wilcoxon 
tests. 
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month period, in solvent firms both the number of sale trades and the number of directors 
making these trades fall during the last-trading window, from 200 to 170 and from 146 to 135 
respectively. Finally, the average value of purchase transactions in insolvent firms increases in 
the last trading period by 35 percent from £20K to £27K. This corresponds to an increase in 
the ratio of the average value of purchase transactions to the market capitalisation of insolvent 
firms, from 0.11 to 0.15 percent. However, although the ratio also increases for sale 
transactions from 0.21 to 0.31 percent, the average value drops by about 27 percent from £154K 
in the 6-12m period to £112K in the 0-6m period. Finally, we have mixed findings for the 
solvent firms during the same windows. That is, while the average purchase (sale) transaction 
value increases (decreases) from £25K (£163K) to £30K (£133K), the average value ratios are 
more stable between the two six-month periods. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Turning to the findings in Panel B, the number of trading directors who make purchase 
transactions in insolvent firms significantly increases from 95 in the 6–12m window to (298) 
in the 0–6m trading window, suggesting about a 212 percent increase. On the other hand, the 
number of directors who make sale transactions in the last period is only 33, increasing by 
about 27 percent from 26. Furthermore, similar to the findings provided in Panel A, the average 
value of purchase transactions per director in insolvent firms also increases during the last 
trading period. Specifically, an average director’s aggregate purchase (sale) trade is about £37K 
(£164K) in this period, increased (decreased) from £32K (£213K) in the 6-12m period by about 
16 (23) percent. Moreover, the corresponding increase in the ratio of the average value of 
purchase (sale) transactions to the market capitalisation is from 0.17 (0.29) to 0.20 (0.45) 
percent. Finally, as for the solvent firms, similar to the conclusion for Panel A, we argue that 
pattern is not clear-cut. That is, similar to insolvent firms, the average purchase (sale) 
transaction value increases (decreases) in solvent firms, namely from £43K (£223K) to £54K 
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(£168K). However, the average value ratios are stable for both purchases and sales between 
the two six-month periods.9  
It is possible that although the directors of insolvent firms purchase shares prior to 
insolvency, they may find it difficult to sell their holdings later as the market for shares 
becomes illiquid due to insolvency concerns.10 To investigate this issue we measure trading 
liquidity using a volume-related measure similar to that in Lee and Swaminathan (2000) and 
Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2001). Specifically, we estimate the liquidity for both 
solvent and insolvent firms for all the periods considered in our estimations by the trading 
volume measure 𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡 = ∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖=1 , where Nt denotes the number of trades between t-1 and t and qi 
is the number of shares of trade i. Our findings suggest that, compared to the 6-12m period, the 
trading volume, i.e. liquidity, increases in the insolvent group of firms in the last trading 
window before insolvency, by about 56 percent. During the same period, the liquidity for 
solvent firms increases by only about 9 percent. We accordingly argue that the illiquidity of 
the insolvent firms’ shares is not likely to be a matter of concern to the trading directors.  
Overall, the analysis of the findings presented in Table 2 suggests that the purchase 
behaviour of the insolvent-firm directors prior to insolvency is distinct and sufficiently 
unambiguous. In the last six-month trading period prior to insolvency, directors increase their 
purchases much more notably than sale transactions, evidenced by the significant changes in 
the number of transactions, the transaction volume measured both in sterling terms and relative 
to market value, and the number of trading directors. The findings suggest that the 
characteristics of directors’ dealings, in particular purchase trades, during the period prior to 
insolvency can be informative as to the subsequent event of insolvency. 
                                                 
9 In addition to the analysis provided in Table 2, we also examined only the last trades which were carried out by 
the directors of insolvent firms. In line with the results for the aggregated trades, we find that about 91 percent of 
the last open-market insider transactions made in insolvent firms are purchase trades. On average, there are 1.96 
trades made by the directors, of which only 0.18 are sale transactions. Also, the ratio of purchase transactions to 
market capitalisation is about 0.44 percent, compared to about 0.26 percent for the whole period.   
10 We thank an anonymous referee for raising this point. 
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5. Results 
5.1. Summary statistics and univariate analysis 
In Table 3 we report the mean values and their standard deviations for the whole sample and 
separately for the solvent and insolvent firms. Furthermore, the mean difference t-test results 
for each variable are reported, where the null hypothesis is that the mean values of the variables 
across the solvent and insolvent groups are equal. We present our findings by grouping the 
variables in four categories: corporate governance, accounting and market variables, and 
directors’ trading.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Starting with the discussion of the corporate governance characteristics, the results reveal 
significant differences between solvent and insolvent firms with respect to board size, 
independence and institutional ownership. We find that the companies that filed for insolvency 
have on average smaller boards, with about six members, compared to approximately seven 
directors sitting on the average solvent firm’s board. We also show that the composition of the 
board across the two samples is significantly different. Specifically, the non-executive directors 
of insolvent firms constitute on average about 47 percent of the board, compared with more 
than 52 percent in solvent firms. The results suggest that the boards of solvent firms in our 
sample tend to be more independent than the insolvent firms. Despite the differences in the 
total number of directors represented on the board, the equity ownership of board members is 
almost the same in both groups at about 13 percent. Finally, we find that the average 
institutional ownership portfolio in the insolvent sample of firms is significantly higher than 
that for the control firms, about 31 and 21 percent respectively.  
There are also significant differences between the two samples regarding the accounting 
variables used in the analysis. Not surprisingly, the mean leverage ratio (about 28 percent) for 
insolvent firms is significantly higher than for the solvent firms (about 16 percent). Compared 
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to the firms in the solvent sub-sample, insolvent firms are significantly smaller and a smaller 
percentage of them pay out dividends to shareholders during the sample period. As for the 
market variables, the stock return for insolvent firms prior to the event of insolvency is 
negative, approximately -32 percent, and significantly lower than the average return on the 
solvent firms’ stocks, which is just under 10 percent. The volatility of past returns is expectedly 
higher for insolvent firms. Overall, the comparison of the relevant accounting and market 
variables indicates that the insolvent firms used in the analysis exhibit greater risk and a higher 
degree of financial constraint. Moreover, the differences seem to be perceived by the market 
correctly, reflected in lower returns and greater stock return volatility.  
Turning to the results on insider trading measures, we present important differences between 
the two samples with regards to the mean values of net purchase ratio (NPR), the number of 
trades in a firm, and the insider activity ratio before the insolvency event. More specifically, 
the NPR for insolvent firms in the last trading period is significantly greater than that for solvent 
firms, which are respectively 0.70 and 0.35. This finding suggests that on aggregate, compared 
to solvent firms, the directors of insolvent firms make significantly more purchase than sale 
transactions prior to insolvency. However, the difference in the NPR between the two groups 
during the other trading periods is not statistically significant. The results also indicate that 
although the average number of trades in firms filing for insolvency is significantly smaller in 
the further trading periods, namely 6-12m and 12-24m periods, it becomes greater for insolvent 
firms in the last trading period. This is in contrast to Seyhun and Bradley (1997) who find that 
insiders mostly sell their stocks prior to insolvency. It is also important to observe that the 
average number of trades in insolvent firms increases in the 0-6m period to 3.94 from about 
1.61 in the 6-12m period. On the other hand, in solvent firms it increases only slightly to 3.04 
from 2.87 during the same period. A similar pattern emerges regarding the average value of 
active directors. That is, while the ratio of active number of directors to board size is higher in 
an average solvent firm in the earlier periods, the ratio becomes significantly higher for 
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insolvent firms in the last period. It is also worth mentioning that the active insiders ratio for 
insolvent firms increases from about 18 percent in the 6-12m period to 51 percent in the 0-6m 
period, where as it remains almost unchanged at about 25 percent for solvent firms. This is in 
line with the findings of Ryan (2005), who reports that in situations of increased interest from 
analysts, insider trading volume decreases. 
Our preliminary findings indicate that the patterns of directors’ dealings differ significantly 
between the insolvent and solvent groups of firms during the relatively long period before the 
insolvency event. However, the striking finding from our analysis is that the directors of firms 
in the insolvent group increase the volume and number of their purchases nearer the insolvency. 
Combined with the findings in the previous section, our descriptive analysis suggests that the 
way in which the directors of insolvent firms trade in their own shares may prove to be relevant 
in estimating the probability of insolvency. 
5.2. Multivariate logit analysis 
This section investigates the determinants of the likelihood of insolvency. In Table 4 we 
present the results from four different logit specifications. Model 1 is our baseline model, 
estimating the likelihood of insolvency as a function of only the accounting, market and 
corporate governance variables. In Models 2 to 4 we incorporate our three measures of 
directors’ insider trading, which are the main variables of interest in our analysis. 
5.2.1. Corporate governance, accounting and market variables and the likelihood of 
insolvency 
Starting with Model 1, we find that the majority of the estimated coefficients are generally 
significant and in line with the predictions as to their impact on the likelihood of insolvency. 
Specifically, the findings for the corporate governance characteristics suggest that firms with 
larger and more independent boards are less likely to be insolvent. The negative and 
significantly estimated coefficient of board size is inconsistent with the traditional view (see, 
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e.g., Yermack 1996) that small boards are more efficient and better organized than larger 
boards, which should lead to better firm performance and hence a lower probability of 
insolvency. Instead, firms with larger boards are less likely to be insolvent, supporting the 
evidence provided by Platt and Platt (2012) that larger boards probably provide firms with 
more business contacts, enabling them to avoid insolvency. However, it should be noted that 
financially distressed, in particular near-insolvent, firms are likely to lose directors prior to the 
insolvency (Darrat, Gray and Wu 2010). This may then lead to a negative relation between the 
number of directors and the insolvency event by construction, possibly partly explaining our 
finding. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
The negative impact of board independence on the likelihood of insolvency is consistent 
with the findings of prior research showing that the market reacts more positively to decisions 
taken by outsider-dominated firms (Borokhovich, Parrino and Trapani 1996) and more 
independent boards are likely to be better monitors (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). To the extent 
that boards with greater non-executive director representation are more likely to make better 
decisions and act in shareholders’ interests, greater board independence should lead to better 
performance, lower cost of capital, and hence lower the probability of financial distress. 
Furthermore, financially distressed firms should have a better chance of survival as the access 
of independent boards to external finance is expected to be easier, which is essential to avoid 
bankruptcy. 
As for the impact of equity ownership variables, we do not find a significant relation 
between board ownership and the likelihood of insolvency, while the negative sign is consistent 
with our predictions. This finding does not support the view that board ownership is expected 
to align the interests of managers and owners and therefore to reduce the costs of agency 
problems within corporations (Jensen and Meckling 1976). However, the relation between 
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institutional ownership and the likelihood of insolvency is positive and highly significant. This 
provides further support for the argument that financial institutions, despite their large 
ownership position, do not take an active role in corporate governance in the UK, adopt a 
passive stance towards monitoring and disciplining firms’ management, and hence have little 
influence on managers (Franks, Mayer and Renneboog 2001).  
Not surprisingly, we find a highly significant and positive association between leverage and 
the likelihood of insolvency. The estimated negative relation between dividend policy and the 
probability of insolvency, albeit rather weak, may arise because the firm’s dividend policy can 
indicate its flexibility to resort to internal resources when needed and be seen as an inverse 
proxy for the degree of financial constraint. Dividend paying firms are also expected to be more 
profitable, which would also lower the probability of insolvency. We find that past stock 
returns exert a negative and significant effect on the likelihood of insolvency. In addition, the 
volatility of stock returns is positively related to the likelihood of insolvency. While the high 
stock return volatility can increase the likelihood of insolvency per se, we also note that the 
volatility, observed during the period prior to the insolvency, may be the outcome of the 
expected insolvency. We do not investigate this issue further as we do not examine financial 
distress separately from insolvency. Finally, one result that is inconsistent with a priori 
expectations relates to firm size. Although the sign of the estimated coefficient of firm size is 
expectedly negative, suggesting a lower probability of insolvency for larger firms, the relation 
is not statistically significant. Our findings in relation to the control variables from the baseline 
model hold robustly and hence we do not discuss them again in the rest of the paper.  
5.2.2. Trading activity of directors and the likelihood of insolvency 
As explained earlier, in estimating the relation between insider trading and the likelihood of 
insolvency we use three different proxies in relation to the trading activity of directors. 
Moreover, each proxy is measured over three different time windows to test if the nature of 
directors’ dealings changes as the insolvency approaches, namely the six-months (0–6m), the 
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six-to-twelve-months (6–12m), and the one-to-two-years (12-24m) periods prior to the date 
when the last trading was observed. In Model 2 we examine the impact of net purchase ratio 
(NPR), which is defined as the ratio of the difference between aggregate purchases and sales 
to the sum of aggregate purchases and sales made by insiders. The results reveal that the 
influence NPR exerts on the likelihood of insolvency is positive and significant during the last 
six-month period of trading. However, the estimated relation in the earlier periods is negative, 
albeit statistically significant only in the 6-12m period. These findings are in support of the 
earlier descriptive analysis that directors increase their purchase transactions before they cease 
trading completely, possibly to reduce the risk of litigation related to insider trading. Also, the 
negative impact of NPR on the likelihood of insolvency in earlier periods would be in line with 
the view that insider purchases are informative indicating that managers are normally more 
likely to purchase when the expected future performance of their firms is favourable. 
In Model 3 we estimate the relation between the likelihood of insolvency and the total 
number of trades performed by insiders, used as a proxy for trading activity, without 
distinguishing between purchases and sales. The estimated coefficient of this variable in the 
first window (0–6m) is positive and highly significant. As shown earlier, the observed increases 
in the last trading period are mainly due to open market purchases rather than sales. It is 
therefore likely that the positively estimated relation between the number of insider 
transactions and the likelihood of insolvency provides further support for the suggestion that 
insiders become significantly more active in purchasing shares before they stop trading. It is 
also important to note that the positive relation is not in line with the view that insiders would 
be more cautious and diligent when trading ahead of adverse events such as insolvency. 
However, this view seems to hold for the earlier windows. The impact of the number of trades 
is negative and significant, having an opposite impact on the probability of insolvency. The 
contrast in the findings between the first and the last two trading periods further supports the 
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conjecture, and our initial findings in the previous section, that the trading behaviour of insiders 
is likely to change significantly in the period leading up to insolvency. 
In Model 4 we investigate the relation between the activity of the board, measured by the 
ratio of the number of trading directors to board size, and the likelihood of entering insolvency. 
The findings are very similar to those we report above with respect to the impact of the number 
of trades on insolvency. Specifically, we find that while insider activity exerts a negative 
influence on the estimated likelihood of insolvency during the last six-month period, the 
relation is reversed during the earlier two windows.  
In conclusion, the results in Table 4 provide strong evidence in support of the view that the 
trading behaviour of directors before insolvency is significantly associated with the likelihood 
of insolvency. More importantly, the estimated relation is not homogeneous and changes in the 
opposite direction between the last six-months trading period and the two earlier periods.  
5.3. Sensitivity analysis: insider trading and the probability of insolvency 
As discussed earlier, the reported coefficients in Table 4 are not sufficient to evaluate the 
marginal impacts of the changes in the variables of interest on the probability of insolvency. 
Therefore in Figures 1 to 3, we provide a sensitivity analysis by evaluating the predicted 
probabilities of insolvency against insider trading variables during the three trading periods. In 
all of the figures, we plot the probabilities using the models reported in Table 4. For example, 
in estimating and plotting the probability of insolvency at different levels of NPR in Figure 1, 
we use the estimated results for Model 2. We evaluate the rest of the independent variables at 
their mean values except the categorical control variables (i.e. year and industry dummies), 
which are evaluated as though there are equal number of observations in each category, and 
therefore are equally probable. 
Overall, the plots suggest that the probability of insolvency is generally more sensitive to 
changes in insider trading measures in the last trading period (0–6m) regardless of the variable 
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used in estimating the probabilities. Furthermore, the upward and downward sloping curves 
plotted in Figures 1–3 are expectedly in line with the estimated coefficients regarding each 
aspect of insider trading. Figure 1 shows that the sensitivity of the probability of insolvency, 
given by the slope, increases significantly in the 0–6 month period as the value of net purchase 
ratio (NPR) increases. For example, the probability increases from about 6 percent to around 
24 percent as the value of NPR ranges from -1 to 1. However, the probability of insolvency is 
much less sensitive to changes in NPR in the earlier windows. The estimated probability curve 
is now downward sloping in the earlier 6–12 month window. For the same change in NPR, the 
probability of insolvency drops to about 12 percent from 27 percent. While the curve is still 
negatively sloped in the last period, the sensitivity is even lower, where the decrease in the 
probability for the same range of change in NPR is only about three percentage points.  
[Insert Figures 1 to 3 here] 
Figures 2 and 3 present a similar analysis for the number of transactions and active insiders 
respectively. Specifically, as shown in Figure 2, the probability of insolvency increases from 
about 8 percent to above 80 percent as insiders in a typical firm increase the number of their 
trades from 0 to 20 during the last six-months trading period. However, in the earlier two 
periods the slope is negative, suggesting that the probability of insolvency decreases as the 
number of trades increases. Finally, the probability of insolvency increases from about 8 to just 
under 70 percent as the ratio of directors engaged in trading goes up from 0 to 100 percent. On 
the contrary, but in line with the trends reported in Figure 1 and 2, in the earlier windows an 
increase in the ratio of active traders decreases the probability of insolvency and at a much 
lower magnitude. For example, as the ratio increases from 0 to 100 percent, the probability of 
insolvency decreases from about 20 (40) to less than 10 (5) percent in the 6–12m (12–24m) 
period. To sum up, the findings of the sensitivity analysis are in line with the regression results 
presented earlier. The results confirm our earlier suggestion that the impact of insider trading 
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on the probability of insolvency during the last trading period differs significantly from that in 
the earlier periods.  
5.4. Additional tests  
To ensure the robustness of our results, we carried out a series of checks. First, in estimating 
the likelihood of insolvency we replace the market and accounting variables with the KZ Index, 
which is generally used in previous research as a proxy for the probability of financial distress 
and financial constraint (Almeida, Campello and Weisbach 2004; Baker, Stein and Wurgler 
2003). The results are not reported separately but they are consistent with our a priori 
expectations that the relationship between the KZ Index and the likelihood of bankruptcy is 
positive. The influence of insider trading variables also remains in line with the main findings 
reported in Table 4.  
5.4.1. Type of transaction: purchases vs. sales 
In Table 5, we first examine if the positive relation between net purchase ratio (NPR) and 
the likelihood of insolvency is driven by one type of transaction. To do so we replace NPR 
with a purchase ratio (PR) in Model 1 and sale ratio (SR) in Model 2. Purchase (sale) ratio is 
defined as the ratio of total volume of purchase (sale) transactions made by insiders over total 
aggregated volume of insider purchases and sales. We report only the findings on the insider 
trading variables for brevity, as the results for the rest of the variables remain qualitatively 
similar with those provided in Table 4. The results suggest that the positive relation between 
the transactions in the last period and the likelihood of insolvency is driven by purchase 
transactions. Specifically, the estimated coefficient of PR in the last trading period is positive 
and highly significant. In line with the earlier findings, the estimated PR coefficients for the 
remaining windows are negative and statistically significant. Furthermore, SR does not exert a 
significant impact in the last trading period. However, the relationship between SR and the 
likelihood of insolvency is negatively significant in the (12-24m) trading period. To conclude, 
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it is important to note that while the purchase and sale transactions have the opposite impact 
on the likelihood of insolvency in the last trading period, we cannot distinguish the two 
transaction types in the earlier trading periods. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
We next perform a similar exercise in Model 3, where we estimate the relation between the 
number of transactions and the likelihood of insolvency, by distinguishing between number of 
purchases and sales. We find that the number of sale transactions made by directors exerts a 
little influence on the likelihood of insolvency. The estimated coefficients are not significant 
in the first two windows, whilst the coefficient in the last window is negative and significant 
at the 1 percent level in the 12–24m period. The findings on the number of purchases, however, 
reveal a highly significant relationship with the likelihood of insolvency, and are also in line 
with our earlier interpretation of the results with regards to the NPR (in Model 2 of Table 4) 
and the SR (in Model 1 of Table 5).  
5.4.2. Type of director: executive vs. non-executive 
As a final robustness test in Table 5, we consider the possibility that the relation between 
the percentages of directors engaged in trading and the insolvency probability changes 
depending on whether the trading insider is an executive or a non-executive director. In Model 
4, we hence incorporate the percentage of executive and non-executive active trading directors 
separately. Similar to the findings for other insider trading characteristics, we find an 
asymmetry with respect to the impact of the percentage of active traders on the likelihood of 
insolvency across different windows. However, while the estimated coefficients in the 0–6m 
period for both types of directors are positive, the statistical significance of the estimation on 
the active non-executive ratio is stronger. More importantly, in the last two periods the 
estimated impact of the active directors’ ratio on the probability of insolvency is significant 
only for non-executive directors. 
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Finally, we also recognise that the impact of types of transaction (i.e. sales and purchases) 
may also vary with the types of directors who trade. To address this possibility we run a number 
of regressions by further classifying each type of transaction into two groups identified by 
director type. The results are in line to our earlier findings and hence are not reported separately. 
Specifically, the impact of sale transactions is insignificant regardless of director type and the 
significant impact of purchases remains unchanged.11 
6. Discussion on the motivations of directors to purchase prior to insolvency 
There are two important findings of our analysis. First, we show that the directors of 
insolvent firms increase their purchases of their own shares as the formal filing for insolvency 
approaches. Second, we establish that there is clearly a positive association between purchase 
transactions and the likelihood of insolvency. These findings are not in line with what would 
normally be expected of the directors of insolvent firms. As we discussed earlier, if insiders 
are better informed than outsiders they should avoid purchasing stocks prior to insolvency, 
which leads to a prediction that purchase transactions are negatively associated with the 
probability of insolvency. This superior information prediction is also supported with the 
evidence provided by previous research, which shows that the changes in the trading patterns 
of insiders before major price-relevant corporate announcements are consistent with the 
subsequent event (e.g. seasoned equity offerings (Karpoff and Lee 1991), dividend initiations 
and/or cuts (Kose and Lang 1991), stock repurchases (Lee, Mikkelson and Partch 1992), and 
mergers and acquisitions (Seyhun 1990)). Accordingly, we conclude that the purchase 
                                                 
11 For robustness purposes, in order to account for the effect of the amount of time (t) between the date of directors’ 
last trading and the date of insolvency filing on the estimated logistic regression associations, we perform 
additional analysis with the application of proportional Cox hazard model on the single-period data. In this 
context, the superior feature of the semi-parametric Cox hazard model relates to the treatment of differences in 
time t between the firms. In particular, the model compares subjects when the values of t are identical, and 
therefore share the same risk of the event. The results obtained from the Cox hazard model are in line with findings 
provided by the logistic regression models presented in section 5.2 and hence are not reported separately. 
However, they are available from the authors upon request. 
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transactions of directors prior to insolvency are unlikely to be driven by directors’ superior 
information about the imminent insolvency. In the following, we explore several potential 
reasons for the directors of insolvent firms to trade in their own shares and in particular to 
increase their purchases notably. 
6.1. Signalling motives and litigation risk 
One explanation relates to the possibility that insiders may purchase shares in an attempt to 
affect the market’s perception of the firm’s financial situation and hence to reduce the 
probability of insolvency. This is more likely to happen in severe financial distress when the 
probability of insolvency is significantly high. Managers, compared to other stakeholders in 
the firm, are known to have stronger incentives to avoid bankruptcy. It is well established in 
the literature that insolvencies are costly to all the stakeholders of the firm. However, the costs 
that are born by managers are significantly higher as they also have their human capital invested 
in the firm (Eckbo, Thorburn and Wang 2012; Gilson 1989). It is therefore reasonable to 
assume that directors may have incentives to affect the market’s sentiment through their 
purchase activities if doing so is likely to reduce the likelihood of insolvency or delay it. It is 
also important to note that these incentives are likely to be stronger in the UK for at least two 
reasons. First, compared to many other bankruptcy codes, in particular to the US code, the UK 
insolvency code is known to be more favourable to creditors, leading to a greater probability 
of insolvency when companies are in financial distress (Acharya, Sundaram and Kose 2011; 
Ozkan 1996). Second, in contrast to the US where under Chapter 11 the incumbent 
management is allowed to maintain control of the firm’s assets and its operations, in the UK 
the managers of insolvent firms surrender control to insolvency practitioners. Put together, 
these arguments form the view that it may be reasonable to expect directors to purchase their 
own shares if there is any scope for avoiding or delaying the insolvency. At least, given the 
evidence in the literature in favour of the positive short-term reaction of the market to purchase 
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transactions by insiders, the efforts of directors to impact the market’s perception of the firm 
through purchases can be seen to some extent reasonable and desirable.  
Testing the signalling motives of directors to purchase shares prior to insolvency requires a 
different framework from that adopted in this paper and is also beyond the objective of this 
paper. However, in Table 6 we provide cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for up to five 
trading days following the announcement day.  We estimate the market-adjusted abnormal 
return for firm i on day t as ARi,t = Ri,t – Rm,t, where Ri,t is the daily return for the traded share 
i on day t and Rm,t is the return on the value-weighted FTSE All-Share12 index on the same day 
(Croci et al, 2010).  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
We report CARs for five different windows, from CAR(0,1) to CAR(0,5) where, for 
example, CAR(0,1) gives the cumulative abnormal return on the first trading day following the 
announcement of insider trading, given as day 0. For purchase transactions made by insiders, 
the CARs in all of the windows are positive and mostly significant. However, the strongest 
positive results are observed during the last trading period, 0-6m. We have mixed results for 
the CARs regarding the sale transactions. They generate lower, and negative, CARs in the last 
trading period. The CARs for the sale transactions in the earlier periods are positive. The 
difference in the CARs of insiders’ purchases and sales are statistically significant in the 0-6m 
period, suggesting that the market reaction to purchases and sales differs considerably. This 
finding is in line with Fidrmuc, Georgen and Renneboog (2006), which also shows that the 
market reaction to both purchases and sales in poorly performing and financially distressed 
firms is stronger. Interestingly, the CARs of directors’ purchases and sales in earlier periods 
                                                 
12 FTSE ALL-Share Index represents about 99 percent of UK market capitalization, aggregating of the FTSE 100, 
FTSE 250 and FTSE Small Cap Indices (http://www.ftse.com/Indices/UK_Indices). Each company in the Index 
is first weighted using the number of shares-in-issue and the share price. Then, the free float factor is incorporated 
to arrive at the final weight, considering only the shares available for trading and hence ignoring those shares held 
by restricted shareholders such as family owners.  
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are either insignificant or weakly significant in few cases. Moreover, CARs for sales are 
positive, contrasting our findings for the 0-6m trading period. This result might suggest that 
the market perceives that transactions made in the verge of insolvency (0-6m window) carry 
more information than those in earlier periods. 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
In an attempt to provide further insights, we present a 22-day moving average plot for the 
insolvent firms’ daily market- adjusted returns across the period of 24 months prior to 
insolvency. The plotted trend-line clearly shows that the returns of insolvent firms are generally 
negative and lower than the returns for solvent firms. More importantly, in the period leading 
up to insolvency the returns first sharply fall and bounce back significantly, possibly due to 
increased purchase activities observed during the last trading period, which is also in line with 
the CAR analysis.  
The directors of financially distressed firms may also want to reduce their sale and/or 
increase their purchase transactions before insolvency to minimise the risk of litigation. As we 
discussed earlier, the relevant risk in the UK in this respect is that of wrongful trading, which 
can be brought forward against directors if it can be shown that they traded when they knew 
that there was no reasonable prospect of the company avoiding insolvent liquidation. Also in 
line with the litigation risk view of insider trading, it is shown in prior studies that insiders, in 
an attempt to reduce their risk exposure, decrease their timely trades before major events. 
Specifically, insiders reduce sales and increase purchases ahead of negative and positive news 
respectively (see, e.g., Chen, Martin and Wang 2013; Seyhun 1992). 
 
 
6.2. Managerial overconfidence 
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The above explanations of directors’ incentives to purchase prior to insolvency are based on 
the assumption that directors are generally rational. In that framework, directors act rationally 
in their own best interest by exploiting the asymmetric information with regard to the likelihood 
of insolvency, though not necessarily, at the expense of outsiders.  
The assumption of rationality may, however, not hold. Directors can be irrational and 
therefore biased in their perception of the likelihood of insolvency and the future prospects of 
their firms. One of the behavioural managerial biases affecting their trading behaviour is 
overconfidence. In particular, in the context of this study, overconfident directors are likely to 
underestimate the likelihood of insolvency and/or overestimate the expected future returns as 
a consequence of their illusion of control and the commitment to good outcomes. 
Overconfident directors of insolvent firms may then choose to purchase shares, with a belief 
that the firm is undervalued and its chance of survival is significant enough. 
The most robust method to proxy the level of managerial confidence was developed by 
Malmendier and Tate (2005) in their study on the US data exploring behavioural biases of the 
Chief Executive Officers (CEOs). Building their proxies upon the CEOs behaviour in relation 
to the exercise of stock options they hold, they claim that the executives who hold their options 
until the expiration date can be classified as overconfident.  
In the UK the life span of the vast majority of managerial stock options is 10 years, with a 
vesting period of 3 years (Croci et al., 2010). As mentioned above, the trading that we imply 
can be motivated by managerial overconfidence occurs in the last 6 months of trading of our 
insolvent firms. During this window, we observe only 51 distinct CEOs in insolvent firms 
among the insider traders. The average of 3 years tenure of the executives at the time of 
observation in our sample does not give us an opportunity to test in a robust manner the 
overconfidence motivation. Still, in order to shed light on the relevance of managerial biases 
in determining the outcome of severe financial distress, we attempt to provide some 
preliminary analysis. Following Schrand and Zechman (2012) we employ three CEO 
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characteristics that might be taken as a proxy for overconfidence. First, we consider CEO’s 
tenure which has been associated with an increase of the perceived controllability which results 
in optimistic bias (Weinstein and Klein, 1996). Also, Malmendier et al. (2011) and Hirshleifer 
et al. (2012) find that overconfident CEOs have significantly longer tenures. CEO tenure is 
normally used to measure managerial ability, so it would not be surprising that ability is 
associated with confidence. Second, we consider whether the CEO is also the founder or co-
founder of the company. A founder CEO holds a formal position in the organizational hierarchy 
and possesses unique competencies at firm specific level, which might contribute to 
overconfidence (Galema et al., 2012). As our third measure, we consider the level of education. 
Education is a measure of expertise which might proxy overconfidence, in the sense that 
expertise might make individuals to believe that they are better than average at a task (Schrand 
and Zechman, 2012).  
We classify a CEO as overconfident using any (either or) of the following criteria. First, 
based on CEO’s tenure, we choose the top 25 percent, which classifies a CEO with tenure of 
five years or more as overconfident. CEO tenure is measured as a continuous variable equal to 
the number of years between the CEO’s start date at such position in the company and the year 
of the insider trade. Second, founder is a dummy variable that equals one if the CEO is also the 
founder of the company. Third, education is a discrete variable which gives the following 
values: No college (0); Bachelor’s degree (1); Master’s degree or Professional Qualification 
(2); two Master’s degrees (2.5); Doctorate degree (3); and classify in the overconfident group 
those individuals who have a level of education of (2) or more. Using these proxies, we then 
distinguish between the transactions made by overconfident managers and others. Based on an 
analysis of 68 purchase transactions made by all CEOs in our sample, we are however unable 
to provide support for the prediction overconfident CEOs make more purchases than others 
before insolvency.  
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7. Conclusion 
This paper provides an empirical investigation on the determinants of the likelihood of 
insolvency. The main objective is to examine if insider transactions performed by company 
directors before insolvency are associated with the event. To do so, the study distinguishes 
between purchase and sale transactions made by the directors of a sample of both solvent and 
insolvent firms in the UK during the period 2000 to 2010. Furthermore, the trading period prior 
to insolvency is divided into three distinct sub-periods to investigate whether the trading 
behaviour of directors change nearer the insolvency event.  
Our analysis provides clear-cut evidence that insiders increase their purchase transactions 
significantly in the period leading to insolvency. The results from the logistic regression 
analysis also support this finding, revealing a positive relationship between net purchase (NPR) 
and the probability of insolvency only in the six-months trading period before the insolvency. 
In more distant periods the relation is negative and insignificant. The results hold when the 
analysis is repeated by incorporating purchase and sale trades in separate estimations. 
Specifically, there is a positive relation between purchases and the likelihood of insolvency 
only during the last trading period. However, there is no convincing evidence for the existence 
of a significant relation between sale transactions and the likelihood of insolvency during the 
same window of trading. Finally, we find that the relation between insider trading 
characteristics and the likelihood of insolvency is similar across executive and non-executive 
directors’ dealings. 
We also find that board size and independence, and the equity ownership of institutional 
investors are significant corporate governance characteristics in determining the probability of 
insolvency. Interestingly, the negative impact of board size and the positive influence of 
institutional ownership on insolvency are not consistent with what previous corporate 
governance and corporate bankruptcy studies show. We argue that the differences in the 
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interplay between these firm-specific governance features and the likelihood of insolvency are 
due to the specific characteristics of the corporate governance system in the UK. 
 Overall, the findings of our study point to the importance of insider trading characteristics 
in determining the probability of insolvency. An avenue for future research is to further 
distinguish between different directors by focusing on the potential differences regarding the 
incentives of, for example, firms’ CEOs and CFOs. It is also important to incorporate country-
specific information in the analysis with regard to insider trading, bankruptcy procedures, and 
corporate governance characteristics to provide more insights into corporate bankruptcy 
models.  
Finally, the findings of our analysis may partly arise from the biased view of irrational 
investors. Distinguishing between rational and irrational trading motives of directors is hence 
important in investigating the relationship between directors’ dealings and the likelihood of 
insolvency. Equally, it is important, though challenging, to test if the increasing efforts of 
insiders in insolvent firms to influence the market’s perception during the period preceding the 
insolvency are successful for some firms in avoiding bankruptcy. This awaits future research. 
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9. Tables and Figures 
Table 1 
Insolvent and solvent firms by year and industry 
Panel A. Number of firms by year 
 Year  Insolvent Solvent Total sample 
 2000  14 28 42 
 2001  11 30 41 
 2002  14 49 63 
 2003  23 45 68 
 2004  7 24 31 
 2005  6 8 14 
 2006  9 39 48 
 2007  11 42 53 
 2008  11 37 48 
 2009  3 22 25 
 2010  8 33 41 
  Total   117 357 474 
 
 
Panel B. Number of firms by industry  
 
ICB code 
   
Total sample ICB name  Insolvent Solvent 
Basic Materials 1000  6 28 34 
Consumer Goods 2000  33 89 122 
Consumer Service 3000  19 63 82 
Health Care 4000  7 38 45 
Industrials 5000  29 86 115 
Technology 6000  8 5 13 
Telecommunication 9000  15 48 63 
  Total   117 357 474 
This table presents the distribution of insolvent and solvent (control) firms. Panel A presents the 
frequency of firms in each group across the years in the sample period. Panel B shows the distribution 
of firms across the industries on the basis of the Industry Classifying Benchmark (ICB). 
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Table 2  
Characteristics of purchase and sale transactions across insolvent and solvent firms  
    Insolvent   Solvent   Mean-comparison test 
  
 
 
N 
Mean 
(%) 
Mean 
(£000)  N 
Mean 
(%) 
Mean 
(£000)  
Mean 
(%)  
Mean 
(£)  
 
Panel A. Number and size of transactions           
 
Purchases 0-6 m 413 0.15 27 914 0.07 30 -7.04 *** 0.79 
 6-12 m 152 0.11 20 823 0.08 25 -1.92 * 1.25 
 12-24 m 245 0.11 28 1587 0.07 28 -3.32 *** 0.11 
Sales 0-6 m 48 0.31 112 170 0.18 133 -2.79 ** 0.94 
 6-12 m 36 0.21 154 200 0.17 163 -0.97  0.27 
 12-24 m 51 0.26 131 432 0.19 136 -1.69 * 0.24 
 
Panel B.  Number of directors and size of their transactions           
 
Purchases 0-6 m 298 0.20 37 504 0.12 54 -4.51 *** 2.10 ** 
 6-12 m 95 0.17 32 480 0.13 43 -1.34  1.53  
 12-24 m 177 0.16 39 832 0.14 54 -0.64  1.98 ** 
Sales 0-6 m 33 0.45 164 135 0.23 168 -2.20 ** 0.11 
 6-12 m 26 0.29 213 146 0.23 223 -0.76 0.18 
  12-24 m 37 0.36 181  287 0.28 205  -0.85  0.68  
This table presents the insider trading characteristics by distinguishing between purchase and sale transactions across both solvent and insolvent firms, made in 
the three trading periods. Panel A reports the total number of transactions (N) and average transaction size (mean). Panel B reports the average transaction volume 
per director (mean) and the number of distinct trading directors observed (N). In both panels, the reported mean values are measured in two ways, first as a ratio of 
the average transaction size to market capitalisation (%) and in sterling values expressed in thousands (£). The significance of mean-differences between solvent 
and insolvent firms is tested using a t-test statistic under the null hypothesis that the mean values of the variables between the two types of firms are equal. ***, **, 
* indicate that t-test is significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Table 3  
Descriptive statistics and mean comparisons of the variables used in estimations 
  Full sample   Insolvent Solvent    
 Mean Std. dev. Mean Mean t-test 
Corporate governance characteristics        
Board size 6.54 2.16 5.70 6.81 4.96 *** 
Board independence 0.51 0.16 0.47 0.52 3.39 *** 
Board ownership 0.13 0.17 0.13 0.13 0.01  
Institutional portfolio 0.23 0.30 0.31 0.21 -3.14 *** 
Accounting variables        
Size 17.812 1.892 17.14 18.032 4.5 *** 
Leverage 0.187 0.196 0.279 0.157 -4.98 *** 
Dividend 0.593 0.492 0.342 0.675 6.64 *** 
Market variables        
Return volatility 0.133 0.086 0.171 0.121 -5.67 *** 
Stock return -0.006 0.598 -0.317 0.096 6.78 *** 
Directors’ trading        
NPR 0-6m 0.435 0.734 0.703 0.346 -4.66 *** 
NPR 6-12m 0.282 0.701 0.238 0.296 0.78  
NPR 12-24m 0.343 0.773 0.350 0.341 -0.10  
No. of trades 0–6m 3.259 4.549 3.94 3.036 -1.87 * 
No. of trades 6–12m 2.555 4.283 1.607 2.866 2.78 *** 
No. of trades 12–24m  4.884 6.334 2.53 5.655 4.74 *** 
Active insiders 0–6m 0.32 0.283 0.513 0.251 -9.46 *** 
Active insiders 6–12m 0.24 0.259 0.176 0.256 2.91 *** 
Active insiders 12–24m 0.41 0.325   0.321 0.445 3.63 *** 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the independent variables used in the study. The statistics are provided for the whole sample and insolvent and 
solvent firms separately. The mean difference t-test compares the mean values of the variables between insolvent and control firms under the null hypothesis 
that the mean values of the variables across the two sub-samples are equal. ***, **, * indicate that t-test is significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. The 
definitions of variables are provided in Appendix 1. 
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Table 4 
Logistic regressions: insider trading and the likelihood of insolvency  
  (1)  (2) (3)  (4)  
Board size -0.218 ** -0.211 ** -0.250 ** -0.280 ** 
 [0.094]  [0.095]  [0.105]  [0.113]  
Board independence -1.763 * -1.843 * -1.230  -1.280  
 [0.970]  [0.991]  [1.049]  [1.138]  
Board ownership -0.140  0.179  0.055  -0.190  
 [0.867]  [0.906]  [0.899]  [0.957]  
Institutional portfolio 1.612 *** 1.615 *** 1.785 *** 1.764 *** 
 [0.427]  [0.447]  [0.463]  [0.488]  
Size -0.147  -0.144  -0.180  -0.110  
 [0.128]  [0.130]  [0.144]  [0.150]  
Leverage 3.168 *** 3.054 *** 2.982 *** 2.819 *** 
 [0.745]  [0.764]  [0.800]  [0.852]  
Dividend  -0.641 * -0.723 ** -0.420  -0.410  
 [0.333]  [0.343]  [0.371]  [0.389]  
Stock return -1.562 *** -1.542 *** -1.720 *** -1.840 *** 
 [0.274]  [0.281]  [0.316]  [0.342]  
Return volatility 6.055 *** 5.796 *** 6.536 *** 7.453 *** 
 [1.814]  [1.936]  [2.055]  [2.129]  
NPR 0–6m    0.754 ***     
   [0.223]      
NPR 6–12m   -0.494 **     
   [0.220]     
NPR12–24m  -0.090     
   [0.202]     
No. of trades0–6m    0.230 ***  
    [0.047]    
No. of trades6–12m      -0.170 ***  
     [0.057]    
No. of trades12–24m     -0.260 ***  
     [0.057]    
Active insiders0–6m      3.604 *** 
      [0.623]  
Active insiders6–12m     -1.200 * 
      [0.657]  
Active insiders12–24m     -2.600 *** 
      [0.565]  
Constant 2.686  2.26 2.669 1.567  
 [2.121]  [2.157] [2.351] [2.445]  
 
N 474 474 474 473  
Log-likelihood value -178.04 -170.38 -153.00 -141.00 
Pseudo R2 0.3279  0.357  0.424  0.465  
This table presents the results of the logistic regressions between the dichotomous insolvency 
variable and the insider trading variables. All models include time and industry dummies. ***, **, * 
indicate that the estimated coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
Standard errors are reported in brackets. The definitions of variables are provided in Appendix 1. 
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Table 5 
Additional logistic regressions for robustness checks 
 (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)  
 PR 0–6m 1.532 *** SR 0–6m -0.153  No. of purchases 0–6m 0.243 *** Active Ex 0–6m 2.057 ** 
  [0.369]   [0.436]   [0.049]   [0.809]  
 PR 6–12m -0.765 ** SR 6–12m 0.08  No. of purchases 6–12m -0.198 *** Active Ex 6–12m -0.816  
  [0.315]   [0.472]   [0.065]   [0.914]  
 PR 12–24m -0.998 *** SR 12–24m -1.324 *** No. of purchases 12–24m -0.223 *** Active Ex 12–24m -1.049  
 [0.334]   [0.463]   [0.060]  [0.853]  
      No. of sales 0–6m 0.136 Active Non-Ex 0–6m 5.317 *** 
       [0.156]  [1.038]  
     
 
No. of sales 6–12m -0.008 Active Non-Ex 6–12m -2.176 * 
      [0.183]  [1.200]  
      No. of sales 12–24m -0.403 *** Active Non-Ex 12–24m -3.35 *** 
       [0.148]  [1.182] 
Constant 1.898  2.541  2.727  0.861 
 [2.262]  [2.122]  [2.359]  [2.451] 
N 474  474  474  474 
Log-likelihood value -160.35  -173.02  -151.4  -144.25 
Pseudo R2 0.395    0.347    0.429    0.455  
This table presents the results of the additional logistic regressions for robustness purposes. Models 1 and 2 expand Model 2 of Table 4 by distinguishing between 
the types of transactions. Specifically, in Model 1 NPR is replaced by purchase ratio (PR) defined as the ratio of total volume of purchase transactions made by insiders 
to total aggregated volume of insider purchases and sales, and in Model 2 sale ratio (SR) is incorporated in a similar manner. Model 3 extends Model 3 in Table 4, also 
by distinguishing between the types of transactions and includes the number of sales and purchases separately. Finally, Model 4 extends Model 4 in Table 4 by 
distinguishing between the types of directors, i.e. executive directors (Active EX) proxied by the percentage of active executive trading directors, and non-executive 
directors (Active Non-Ex) proxied by the percentage of active non-executive trading directors. For brevity, we do not report accounting, market and corporate governance 
variables that are included in the models as control variables. All models include time and industry dummies.  ***, **, * indicate that the estimated coefficient is 
significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Standard errors are reported in brackets. The definitions of variables are provided in Appendix 1. 
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Table 6 
Market reaction to transactions of directors of firms facing insolvency  
   CAR(0;1)  CAR(0;2)  CAR(0;3)  CAR(0;4)  CAR(0;5)  
       
Panel A. Purchases            
 0-6m 1.88 a 2.27 a 1.89 b 2.80 a 2.95 a 
 6-12m 1.07 b 0.85 c 0.76  0.55  0.19  
 12-24m 1.56 a 1.34 a 2.23 a 2.10 a 2.26 a 
            
Panel B. Sales            
 0-6m -2.05 a -1.71 b -3.13 b -4.90 a -4.80 a 
 6-12m 0.15  1.99  2.73 b 2.31 c 2.91 b 
 12-24m 0.78  0.05  0.89  0.25  0.24  
            
Panel C. Mean-comparison test          
 0-6m 5.25 *** 3.84 *** 4.26 *** 6.39 *** 6.26 *** 
 6-12m 1.46  -0.88  -1.39  -1.24  -1.70 * 
 12-24m 1.33   1.43   1.41   1.84 * 1.81 * 
This table presents mean values of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for transactions made by directors of firms facing insolvency. We separately report 
CARs for purchases (Panel A) and sales (Panel B) across the three periods, i.e. 0-6, 6-12, and 12-24 months prior to insolvency.  CARs are estimated for five 
different intervals, namely CAR(0;1), CAR(0;2), CAR(0;3), CAR(0;4), CAR(0;5) where, for example, CAR(0,3) gives the cumulative abnormal return on the 
third trading day following the announcement of insider trading, given as day 0. Abnormal returns are estimated on a daily basis in accordance to the procedure 
outlined in Section 6.2. The mean values presented in both panels (A and B) are tested for significance with application of t-statistics, under the null hypothesis 
that CARs are equal to zero (a, b, c, indicate that t-test is significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively). Panel C reports t-test on comparison of means under 
the null hypothesis that the mean values of CARs across purchases and sales in the defined periods are equal (***, **, * indicate that t-test is significant at 1%, 
5%, and 10% respectively.) 
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Appendix 1  
Definitions of variables  
Variable name Definition 
Insolvency dummy Dummy variable that is equal to one if a company enters insolvency 
procedures and zero otherwise. 
Accounting  
Size Natural logarithm of total assets in constant prices. 
Leverage The ratio of total debt to total assets. 
Dividend  Dummy variable that is equal to one if a company pays dividends to 
its shareholders and zero otherwise. 
Market  
Stock return Aggregated monthly returns minus the aggregated value-weighted 
monthly FTSE all-share index return in the same year. 
Return volatility Standard deviation of the regression of monthly stock returns in a 
year on the value-weighted FTSE all-share index for the same year. 
Corporate governance 
Board size Total number of directors on the board. 
Board independence The ratio of non-executive directors to board size. 
Board ownership The percentage holding of executive and non-executive directors. 
Institutional portfolio  Average institutional portfolio percentage. 
Insider trading  
NPR  Net Purchase Ratio (NPR) is the ratio of the difference between 
aggregate purchases and sales to the sum of aggregate purchases and 
sales made by insiders, during: 
 0–6m                 
 6–12m                
12–24m             
six-months period prior to insolvency 
six- to-twelve-months period prior to insolvency 
one- to two-year period prior to insolvency 
No. of trades Total number of purchases and sales made by all insiders during: 
  0–6m                 
 6–12m                
12–24m             
six-months period prior to insolvency 
six- to-twelve-months period prior to insolvency 
one- to two-year period prior to insolvency 
Active insiders The ratio of number of trading directors (who make open market 
purchases or sales) to board size during: 
  0–6m                 
 6–12m                
12–24m             
six-months period prior to insolvency 
six- to-twelve-months period prior to insolvency 
one- to-two-year period prior to insolvency 
This table gives the definitions of the variables used in the analysis. The definitions are grouped in 
four categories, namely accounting, market, corporate governance and insider trading variables. 
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Figure 1  
The relationship between probability of insolvency and NPR 
 
The graphs plot the probabilities of insolvency for values of NPR across three windows, i.e. 0–6 
months, 6–12 months, and 12–24 months. The probabilities are estimated using the logistic estimates 
reported in Table 4 (Model 2). The remaining independent variables are evaluated at the sample mean, 
with the exception of categorical variables (year and industry) that are treated as though they are equally 
probable. The definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix I.  
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Figure 2  
The relationship between probability of insolvency and number of trades 
 
The graphs plot the probabilities of insolvency for values of number of trades across three windows, 
i.e. 0–6 months, 6–12 months, and 12–24 months. The probabilities are estimated using the logistic 
estimates reported in Table 4 (Model 3). The remaining independent variables are evaluated at the 
sample mean, with the exception of categorical variables (year and industry) that are treated as though 
they are equally probable. The definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix I. 
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Figure 3  
The relationship between probability of insolvency and ratio of active insiders  
 
The graphs plot the probabilities of insolvency for values of active insiders’ ratio across three 
windows, i.e. 0–6 months, 6–12 months, and 12–24 months. The probabilities are estimated using the 
logistic estimates reported in Table 4 (Model 4). The remaining independent variables are evaluated at 
the sample mean, with the exception of categorical variables (year and industry) that are treated as 
though they are equally probable. The definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix I. 
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Figure 4 
Average share price returns of insolvent and solvent firms 
 
 
 This graph reports two trend lines of average market-adjusted returns for the insolvent and solvent 
firms across the period of 24 months prior to insolvency event. Market adjusted returns are estimated 
on a daily basis following the procedure outlined in Section 6.1. Each trend line is plotted on the basis 
of a 22-days moving average. The solid line represents the averaged past returns of insolvent firms. The 
dotted line plots the averaged past returns of control (solvent) firms in our sample. 
-.4
-.2
0
.2
R
et
ur
ns
-1-6-12-18-24
Months prior to the event
Insolvent Solvent
